Why Fukushima made me stop worrying and love nuclear power | George Monbiot | Comment is free | The Guardian
Others were not so sure, with Germany taking to other alternatives to fossil fuels:
Germany's phaseout reveals the true costs of nuclear power
This is bad news for nuclear advocates: Nuclear power turns out even more expensive than we thought. According to a study by Arthur D. Little, the four German nuclear utilities (E.ON, RWE, EnBW, Vattenfall) face costs of at least $25 billion for decommissioning their reactors. After the Fukushima disaster, Germany decided to say goodbye to nuclear by switching off eight reactors immediately while the remaining nine are scheduled for a gradual phaseout by 2022.
Of the many myths about nuclear power, we kinda knew that the myth “nuclear power is cheap” is not true. The stunner is how expensive it turns out to be when you start factoring in its real costs,according to this analyst from a public bank in Germany:
“The quantification of dismantling costs is in line with our estimate amounting to 1 billion euros per block,” but “such estimates comprise several uncertainties”, said Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg (LBBW) analyst Bernhard Jeggle.
There you have it: It costs at least $1.4 billion to dismantle one reactor unit. The utilities are required by law to build up a cash pile to finance the decommissioning. Still, one can expect them to raise rates for their customers. In a regulated market without competition, this would hit ratepayers. In a deregulated electricity market — like Germany — this makes nuclear power less competitive. Customers can choose their power provider and switch to one without nuclear — such as city municipalities or green power brokers (which is very easy). By factoring in the true costs of nuclear power, we are getting closer to a level playing field among different energy sources. This is Environmental Economics 101: The market sends only true price signals if external costs (such as pollution) are being internalized. If we had the perfect market and all external costs of fossil fuels (climate change, air pollution) and nuclear (decommission, contamination, full insurance against an accident, final waste deposit) were truly factored in, renewable energy would today already be cost competitive.
In many countries, the nuclear industry has been pampered with billions of dollars in subsidies while emerging technologies received comparably little support (e.g. the United States). Green Budget Europe, a German think tank, calculated nuclear subsidies over the last half century to $230 billion for Germany alone. It’s one thing to support the deployment of renewable energy and efficiency technologies. It’s another to internalize those costs that the fossil fuel and the nuclear industry burden our societies with. Eventually, we need to do both to transition to a low-carbon economy that is powered completely by renewable energy.
In other words, the costs are too high:
... especially when it comes to insuring the nuclear industry - a cost borne by the state:
Which raises the question of whether nuclear power really is 'the most efficient form of energy':
However, three years on, it was announced today that Japan will be embarking on a new nuclear programme:
BBC News - Japan approves energy plan backing nuclear power
Japan risks public outcry as it brings back nuclear power - Telegraph
Today it was also announced that Russia will be financing Turkey's first nuclear power station:
... whilst at the same time a US company will be 'easing Ukraine’s dependence on Russia for fuel supplies':
But uncertainties in EU energy policy have made the nuclear option uncertain in Europe.
More reports from today:
So who, in Europe, took the decision to rely on Russia for our lifeblood? The answer is that no one did. Europe did not choose an energy policy on the basis of the optimisation of supply security, competitiveness and environmental impact. We have ended up with one, as a result of different and often incompatible ideas dreamt up by internally focused EU commissioners and individual member states.
A few examples. The emissions cut targeted by the so-called 20-20-20 by 2020 programme? That means less coal and more gas. Do not like nuclear power? Even more gas. No gas grid interconnections between European countries? More long-term take or pay contracts. Not happy with domestic shale gas production? More gas from Russia. Do not like Russia? In that case, it is probably worth rethinking policies 1-4. But there has been no one to add up the consequences of our ideas, and if necessary take a different tack.
A few examples. The emissions cut targeted by the so-called 20-20-20 by 2020 programme? That means less coal and more gas. Do not like nuclear power? Even more gas. No gas grid interconnections between European countries? More long-term take or pay contracts. Not happy with domestic shale gas production? More gas from Russia. Do not like Russia? In that case, it is probably worth rethinking policies 1-4. But there has been no one to add up the consequences of our ideas, and if necessary take a different tack.
Meanwhile, also today, a book has been published picturing Chernobyl:
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